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Abstract  
 Timber REITs are an understudied asset class with many direct drivers of value 
not seen in other REITs. With only a few Timber REITs listed on the NYSE, the 
idiosyncrasies between each stock means that it is difficult to draw conclusions at a 
non-stock-specific levels. Unlike other types of REITs, it may be feasible to predict 
value-metrics for Timber REITs based on readily available historical government data. 
This data can predict the behavior of the REITs’ stock movements without 
accounting for market conditions but is not useful when using an excess return model 
based on a market-benchmark approach. However, the selection of an appropriate 
benchmark for Timber REITs may not be clear-cut. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background 
Real Estate returns are generally derived from the actual or expected cash 
flows generated from rents and the dispositions of assets. Broadly speaking, since 
the creation of publicly traded Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), we can split 
the returns of real estate into the returns from portfolios of privately-held real estate 
debt and equity (direct real estate) and publicly traded real estate debt and equity. 
REITs and other securitized real estate vehicles are thought to sensitize to 
fundamental shocks in the real estate market quicker than private real estate vehicles 
(Hoesli, Oikarinen, and Serrano 2015, 105). This phenomenon is in part theorized 
to be because transactions and trades in the public market happen at a fast rate, lower 
fixed and variable costs to change positions, and the existence of securities markets. 
These characteristics increase “Informational efficiency”. Informational efficiency 
refers to the time it takes for markets to react to new information that should 
fundamentally alter an asset's price or value (Barkham and Geltner 1995, 21). Based 
on this research of securitized real estate markets in the early 1990s, public 
securitized real estate markets were found to be more informationally efficient than 
their private counterparts (Barkham and Geltner 1995). 
In addition to this lag, the correlation between REIT returns and the broader 
public market has become stronger. Over a 15 year period from 1990 to 2005, REIT 
 
 
and corporate equities’ prices (but not commodities) became more integrated 
(Chong, Miffre, and Stevenson 2009, 183). 
Despite this strong relationship between overall REIT returns and the 
broader market, there is evidence that Timber REITs do not conform to this finding 
and that there doesn’t exist a long term trend between them and indices such as the 
S&P 500 (La and Mei 269-274).  This along with the fact mentioned above that 
commodities have remained unintegrated with REIT values means that despite the 
evidence that the average REIT is a leading indicator of private data, there may be 
an opportunity to use private data to predict specifically Timber REITs due to the 
nature of Timber REITs’ reliance on commodities (timber, paper products). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 The goal of this research paper is to confirm a statistically significant link 
between historical variables and future Timber REIT return metrics. Specifically, the 
scope of this project is to individually evaluate how the stock price and returns of 
three of these REITs responds to changes in private-sector data relating to the timber 
industry. This research is important because REITs are an attractive asset class for 
pension, fixed income focused, and sovereign wealth funds. If these fund managers 
believe that Timber REITs can add uncorrelated returns to other REITs and the 
market to their portfolios, then they will change their funds’ allocation strategies. 
Timber REIT predictor variables like construction permits, which should 
influence demand for timber and thus REIT price, are sought before any interaction 
with a timber REIT. A timber REIT would know the number of permits filed at the 
same time the public would. This is unlike most REITs, which have access to day-by-
day retail data/information before data is released to the public in the form of 
monthly metric aggregation or news reports. Because the drivers of Timber REITs’ 
values are uncharacteristically-for-REITs forward looking, historical publicly available 
data has predictive power on Timber REITs’ stock price.  
 
 
 
 
REIT Overviews 
Timber REITs are specialty REITs focused on owning and operating 
timberlands. Timber REITs’ operations can include the acquisition and disposition of 
properties, leasing land for recreation or to businesses, selling timber, capitalizing on 
natural resources present on the land, or selling other manufactured wood-based 
products. Timber REITs generally harvest pulpwood or sawwood. Pulpwood is often 
used in the manufacture of paper and paper based products, while sawwood is used 
for more traditional uses of timber such as for construction, industrial use , and 
manufacturing.  
CTT -  CatchMark 
CatchMark was started in 2007 and controlled 496,800 acres of commercial 
timberlands with a product mix of 51% pulpwood and 49% sawtimber by volume 
coming from a 74%/26% pine/hardwood mix of trees. It primarily operated in the 
southern US with most of its acreage existing in Georgia, Alabama, and South 
Carolina. CTT creates value (proxied using Adjusted EBITDA) mostly through 
Timber Operations (70%) and Land Sales (30%). CTT has been aggressive in 
acquiring more acreage in the years 2013- 2016, increasing from less than 35 tons to 
over 40 tons in the time span. Additionally, their sawtimber to pulpwood composition 
has changed considerably over the last few years, going from a 30/70 split for 
 
 
sawtimber to pulpwood between 2011-2013 to a 38/62 split between 2014-2016. The 
firm during the analysis period was not under operational or financial distress due to 
the capital structure.  
* Information taken from 2007 Investor Relations Presentation 
WY - Weyerhaeuser 
Weyerhaeuser has approximately 13 million acres of timberland distributed across the 
West (2.9M acres), South (7.0M acres), and North (2.5M acres) of the United States 
and 14M acres in Canada. Weyerhaeuser’s sources of income come from timber 
delivery, log delivery, recreational, leases, and seed and seedling sales. By area during 
the time of the analysis, most of WY’s inventory was hardwood. The firm during the 
analysis period was not under operational or financial distress due to the capital 
structure.  
* Information taken from 2007 10K 
RYN - Rayonier Inc. 
Rayonier has 2.7 million acres situated in the southern US, Pacific North West, and 
New Zealand (433K acres) focusing primarily on softwood. A large portion (60%) of 
RYN’s product mix was exported to foreign markets during the analysis period. 
Additionally, they were very active in acquiring and disposing of timberland in the 
 
 
analysis period, with $1.3 billion acquired and $680 million sold. The firm during the 
analysis period was not under operational or financial distress due to the capital 
structure.  
* Information taken from 2007 Investor Relations Presentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology and Data Collection 
Data Collection 
In order to collect the monthly stock price of each REIT, data was collected 
from the Ziman REIT Data Series as part of the Center for Research in Security 
Prices research umbrella. This dataset included each REIT’s price as of the last trading 
day of the month. 
A wide range of data was chosen as independent variables, with all datasets 
originating from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database system. The 
following datasets from FRED were collected:  
1.) Monthly Supply of Houses in the United States, Months' Supply, Monthly, 
Seasonally Adjusted 
2.) Price Indexes of New Single-Family Houses Under Construction 
3.) Total Construction Spending, Millions of Dollars, Monthly, Seasonally 
Adjusted Annual Rate 
4.) New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, Thousands of 
Units, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate 
5.) Export Price Index (End Use): Linerboard, newsprint, and other 
paper/paperboard, Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
6.) 30-Year Conventional Mortgage Rate, Percent, Monthly, Not Seasonally 
Adjusted 
 
 
All independent variable datasets were populated with monthly data as of the 1st 
of each month. In order to control for general market conditions on returns and 
price, average monthly total weighted returns of equity REITs was gathered also from 
the Ziman REIT Data Series. 
The rationale for choosing each independent variable was as follows: 
1.) Timber REITs depend on the sale of timber used in the construction of 
homes. With increases in the supply of new homes and permits for future 
developments  you would expect the demand for timber to have increased 
during the time period, causing an upward trend on price, resulting in higher 
revenue for the REIT reflected in either increased earning or share price 
appreciation. 
2.) Similarly, for housing price-indices, paper-price indices,  and construction 
spending, we would expect that an increase in price would mean the inventory 
of the Timber REITs was attractive and their dollar per unit of timber sold 
increased. 
3.) Finally, when interest rates are low, it becomes more attractive to build homes 
because the cost of debt on an individual level becomes cheaper. We would 
expect this to lead to an increase in demand for drivers of Timber REIT value. 
Methodology 
For this research paper an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear 
regression model with a dependent variable of REIT monthly stock price or REIT 
 
 
excess total returns and a set of independent variables relating to the timber industry 
was used. The analysis period for each REIT was set beginning at the initial listing 
date of the REIT on the NYSE and ending as of September 1st 2016. There was a 
natural lag of approximately 1 month between each monthly REIT ask price and each 
corresponding independent variable due to the fact that the REIT prices were as listed 
at the end of the month while the independent variables were listed as of the start of 
the month. Because it is not expected that the information from the dependent 
variable would influence stock price instantaneously, and one month is the smallest 
time frame available to analyze with the data, this one month lag is the “base case”. 
In order to account for the fact that general market conditions will have an 
effect on returns and stock prices, returns in excess of the benchmark chosen (average 
monthly total weighted returns of equity REITs) were used in the regression analysis. 
This is the market model approach to control for movements due to the general 
environment applied using a REIT index instead of a broad market index like the 
S&P 500 (MacKinlay 16).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The returns for each REIT of the benchmark were calculated as follows: 
𝑟𝑏(𝑡)  =  
𝑝(𝑡)𝑓(𝑡) +  𝑑(𝑡)
𝑝(𝑡 − 1)
 
Where:  
t is the trading month 
t-1 is the previous trading month 
𝑟𝑏(t)=  benchmark security’s return for month t  
p(t) = last sale or closing bid/ask for month t 
f(t) = Ziman’s price adjustment factor for month t  
d(t) = cash adjustment for month t (including dividends paid) 
 
The returns of the 3 Timber REITs were calculated as following: 
𝑟𝑒(𝑡)  =  
𝑝(𝑡) +  𝑑(𝑡)
𝑝(𝑡 − 1)
 
Where  
t is the trading month, 
t-1 is the previous trading month.  
𝑟𝑒(𝑡)= security’s return for month t  
p(t) = last sale or closing bid/ask for month for the Timber REIT 
d(t) = Ordinary Dividends paid for month t 
 
 
 
Excess Returns were calculated as follows: 
𝑟𝑟(𝑡) =  𝑟𝑒(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑏(𝑡)  
Where 𝑟𝑟(𝑡) is the excess return of that REIT’s return on month t.  
 
Using the python statistical modules libraries SciPy and Scikit-learn , three 
datasets , each corresponding to the monthly REIT prices of a timber REIT along 
with the corresponding dependent variables indexed by date, were standardized. 
Standardization of all the variables was done because many of the variables were on 
different scales. This ensures that differences in scaling will not affect the regression. 
For each REIT, a multiple linear regression model was fitted using all of the 
independent variables in their base case. After running this initial regression, any 
variables which were not significant at the 95% confidence level [p value< 0.05] were 
removed from the regression to compare effects. Insignificant variables were also 
lagged, in order to account for the fact that timing may affect the relationship between 
variables or removed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
TABLE 1. Regression Results for REIT Stock Prices with 
Unchanged Variables 
 CTT RYN WY 
    
          
Constant  1.2375 0.3132 0.2495 
  (0.042) (0.113) (0.093) 
     
Monthly Supply of Houses  -0.2483 0.0054 -0.1017 
  (0.185) (0.160) (0.138) 
     
Price Index of New Single-Family Houses Under Construction  0.1021 0.2026 0.7613* 
  (0.404) (0.249) (0.288) 
     
Total Construction Spending   
-
1.1858** 
-
0.9379*** -0.6871 
  (0.356) (0.201) (0.270) 
     
Monthly Permit Approvals  0.03663 0.4966*** 0.8087*** 
  (0.273) (0.187) (0.219) 
     
Paper Export Sales  
-
0.7085** 0.2772* 
-
0.6988*** 
  (0.315) (0.161) (0.118) 
     
Mortgage Rates  0.1893 0.4647*** 0.5085*** 
  (0.304) (0.117) (0.099) 
R-Squared   0.583 0.570 0.581 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.487 0.552 0.547 
     
Standard errors are reported in parentheses     
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 90%,95%, and 99* level, respectively.    
^ indicates insignificant F-statistic  
First line of each variable is coefficient      
     
The results above show the initial regression without any change to the 
variables chosen to be included in the model. For CTT, the independent variable mix 
was able to explain 48.7% of the movement in stock prices based on the model’s 
 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 Value. However only two of the independent variables were significant 
(p<5%), Total Construction Spending and Paper Exports.  
RYN had a higher Adjusted 𝑅2 Value (55.2%) and more significant 
independent variables. Specifically, those variables which were at least at the 95% 
confidence level were Mortgage rates, Monthly Permit Approvals, and Total 
Construction spending.  Monthly Permit Approvals’ coefficient is intuitive, however 
both Construction Spending and Mortgage Rate have inverse signs from the expected.  
In the case of WY, we have an Adjusted 𝑅2 of 54.7% which is similar to the 
other REITs. All the variables were significant except for Monthly Housing Supply 
and Total Construction.  
In accordance with the methodology, insignificant variables were dropped from 
the model, and the regressions (seen below) were completed again to see if the overall 
model’s predictiveness would improve. 
 
TABLE 2. Regression Results for REIT Stock Prices 
with Some Initial Insignificant Variables Dropped 
 CTT RYN WY 
    
          
Constant  1.3139 21.2461 0.2173 
  (0.292) (18.356) (0.081) 
     
Monthly Supply of Houses  -0.2526   
  (0.181)   
     
Price Index of New Single-Family Houses Under 
Construction    0.7679* 
    (0.287) 
     
 
 
Total Construction Spending   -1.1875** 0.000*** -0.7594** 
  (0.350) (0.000) (0.250) 
     
Monthly Permit Approvals  0.3817 0.0126*** 0.9078*** 
  (0.262) (0.002) (0.172) 
     
Paper Export Sales  -0.7485** 0.4694*** 
-
0.6992*** 
  (0.267) (0.134) (0.118) 
     
Mortgage Rates  0.149 5.9686*** 0.465*** 
  (0.254) (0.980) (0.080) 
R-Squared   0.582 0.568 0.578 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.505 0.556 0.549 
     
Standard errors are reported in parentheses     
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 90%,95%, and 99* level, respectively.    
^ indicates insignificant F-statistic      
 
Removing the insignificant variable of Price Indices of New Houses for CTT 
increased the predictive power of the model to an Adjusted 𝑅2 of 58.2%. However, 
removing the other insignificant variables lowered the Adjusted 𝑅2, and the 
unintuitive coefficient signs for Paper Exports and Total Construction remained.  
Lagging all variables from a range of 1 to 3 months from the base case made the Price 
Index of New Single Family Homes Under Construction and Monthly Permit 
Approvals significant within the model, but gave a lower overall 𝑅2. 
 For RYN, removing the insignificant variables increased the 𝑅2only 
slightly, but made all remaining independent variables significant. RYN is heavily 
exposed to exports, so paper exports becoming significant with the re-running of the 
 
 
regression seems congruent. Lagging variables from 1 to 3 months also had no effect 
on increasing  𝑅2 or the significance/insignificance of the variables.  
Removing Monthly Supply of Houses for WY made all variables significant 
with a slight increase in Adjusted 𝑅2. However, the “wrong” signs remain on 
Mortgage Rate, Paper Exports, and Total Construction coefficients.  Lagging up to 3 
months did not result in any noticeable results.  
In terms of modeling excess returns, the regression model does a much worse 
job (seen below), with the Prob(F-statistic) indicating that it is very likely none of the 
coefficients are significantly predictive in any of the REITs. This is compounded by 
the negative Adjusted 𝑅2 values for the REITs and the fact that no single variable is 
statistically significant at even the 90% confidence interval level. Lagging did not 
noticeably affect the p values of the coefficients noticeably or the predictiveness of 
the model. 
 
TABLE 3. Regression Results for REIT Excess Returns   CTT^ RYN^ WY^ 
     
          
Constant  5796 
-
0.5633 0.4836 
  (0.444) (1.636) (0.136) 
     
Monthly Supply of Houses  
-
0.1802 0.3667 0.0405 
  (0.194) (0.416) (0.202) 
     
Price Index of New Single-Family Houses Under Construction  -0.229 0.1022 0.1409 
 
 
  (0.424) 
-
(0.853) (0.422) 
     
Total Construction Spending   0.2164 0.588 
-
0.3172 
  (0.373) (1.491) (0.394) 
     
Monthly Permit Approvals  0.017 0.2047 0.1843 
  (0.287) (0.544) (0.320) 
     
Paper Export Sales  0.2745 0.435 
-
0.1102 
  (0.330) (0.587) (0.173) 
     
Mortgage Rates  
-
0.2737 0.1884 
-
0.1004 
  (0.319) (0.837) (0.145) 
R-Squared   0.164 0.178 0.033 
Adjusted R-Squared  -0.029 -0.644 -0.046 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 90%,95%, and 99* level, respectively. 
^ indicates insignificant F-statistic  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion  
The results from each type of regression (excess returns/stock price) indicate 
some clear trends. For the regressions with stock price as the dependent variable the 
𝑅2 values were somewhat predictive ranging between 48.7% and 55.6% with 
significant variables in all models. The predictors were also lagged to varying degrees, 
with none of them improving the model toward meaningful significance 
In the case of Paper Exports, CTT has significant pulpwood operations which 
are a fundamental part of the paper-manufacturing value chain making the fact that 
Paper Exports was significant initially unsurprising. However intuitively, we would 
expect to see the significance of paper exports be reflected with a positive coefficient, 
rather than the negative 0.7085 in the model. Similarly, it would be expected to see the 
significance of Total Construction spending to be reflected with a positive coefficient, 
rather than the negative 1.1858 in the model. 
The variables which were significant in both the base regression and the altered 
regression on RYN’s stock price matches its expected output. RYN operates primarily 
selling softwood, which is used primarily in construction. This lines up with the 
results that Total Construction Spending, Monthly Permit Approvals, and Mortgage 
Rates were all significant at a confidence interval level of 99%. Softwood is not used 
in the production of paper, so we would not expect paper exports to be as significant, 
which was the case. 
 
 
Weyerhaeuser is the largest of the Timber REITs and seems to be the most 
mature in terms of scaling operations and the product/service mix it utilizes for 
revenue. In this sense, having many of the predictors be significant lines up with the 
notion that the predictor variables should reflect the majority of the drivers of 
timberland value and it may be that WY is the only REIT of the three mature enough 
in terms of revenue streams for this hypothesis to be realized. 
There was a general lack of significance with the Monthly Housing Supply 
variable. Of all variables, Monthly Housing Supply was probably the most backward-
looking and in many ways is a function of some of the other variables such as Permit 
Approvals and Construction Spending.  
In terms of modelling excess returns, all models were insignificant, many 
having negative Adjusted 𝑅2 values, and no significant variables. This could signify 
two important things. Firstly, the results of the stock price regressions were 
misleading, and that most of reason why the 𝑅2 values explain the stock price is 
because the independent variables are correlated with the broader health of the 
economy. Certainly, construction material use, a function of demand for housing and 
general construction, correlates with the market. Historically, this average correlation 
has been high at 38.26% (Aswath Damodaran ). Thus, this explanation is certainly 
possible. Secondly, the components of the excess return variable may not accurately 
reflect the relationship between the benchmark index and timber REITs. As stated in 
 
 
the background, research indicates that Timber REIT returns behave differently to 
other REITs, so benchmarking against an index of the returns of REITs on average 
which may be uncorrelated would undue any natural correlation between Timber 
REITs and the independent variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Challenges 
There were some empirical challenges to the study. Firstly,  although the 
significant variables varying in terms of coefficient size between REITs was 
unsurprising due to the varying compositions of each REIT’s revenue sources, all of 
the REITs would be expected to respond to the same variables because all of the 
predictors related to the fundamental operations of Timber REITs.  
Additionally, in some of the regressions, removing insignificant variables made 
the model less predictive. This could be evidence of collinearity among the 
independent variable mix or using too many  regressors in the initial regression, 
resulting in the model itself being somewhat predictive with some of the non-
significant variables being predictive but not enough by themself to attain a low 
individual p-value as variables.  
Furthermore, and importantly in the case of the significant variables in the 
stock price regressions, many of the coefficients were unexpectedly the “wrong” sign. 
Specifically, for the variables of price indices or spending, it’s possible that because 
there was a natural 1 month lag in the regression, the price had increased/decreased 
initially on the onset of the information and then immediately increased/decreased on 
the onset of new information. If the months generally were cyclical (in the sense that 
price/spending tended to revert toward the mean over the months of the analysis), 
then that may be a possible explanation for the unexpected signs. Outside of this 
 
 
explanation, multicollinearity may also be the issue in this, due to some of the 
predictors directly relating to each other: housing permits will become new houses or 
price indices may predict future magnitude of aggregate spending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Looking at the results of both sets of regression predicting stock price for each 
REIT, model was predictive one month after the historical data was published. Based 
on the stock price regressions, to varying degrees, it was successful in explaining the 
movement of the REITs over the analysis period. However, the usefulness and 
validity of the prediction is hard to quantify due to the unclear reasons why the 
coefficients are unintuitive. However, if the initial results are indicative of a significant 
relationship between the historic value drivers and future REIT price, then Timber 
REITs are indeed an outlier in terms of stock behavior relative to other traditional 
REITs, and the prices of Timber REITs fail to adjust immediately to public data 
about their revenue drivers. 
On the other hand, the regressions of excess returns were clear. There was no 
predictive power of the independent variables, and this lines up with the result we 
would expect based on previous research on the informational efficiency of public 
real estate equities.  The point of contention is that the excess returns using a REIT 
index may not be an accurate way to control for market conditions. If some of the 
contemporary research on REITs is correct in that Timber REITs are not strongly 
correlated with the broader market while other REITs are, then using a broad REIT 
index as the benchmark will probably yield unreliable results. 
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